

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ACDE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-07
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /085 W
-----001971 201856Z /42

P 201721Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2301
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0423

FROM US MBFR REP

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: SUMMARY OF JULY 19, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION

MBFR INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS OF JULY 19, 1977.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JULY 19, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION OF VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE CANADIAN REP, FRG REP AND US REP AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP MEISNER AND GDR REP OESER. MILITARY ADVISORS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

2. EASTERN REPS GAVE A NEGATIVE PRELIMINARY REACTION TO WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL OF JULY 15, CLAIMING THAT IT WOULD OBLIGE PARTICIPANTS TO GO INTO ORGANIZATIONAL DETAIL NOT RELATED TO REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS WAS BETTER SUITED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. EASTERN REPS

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CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH DEPARTED FROM THE PARITY PRINCIPLE IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT RESPECTS, AND THAT THE PAST SIX MONTHS OF DATA DISCUSSION HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT WESTERN CLAIMS OF EASTERN MANPOWER DISPARITY WERE BASELESS. THEY PRESENTED A RIGID RESTATEMENT OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION POSITION ON FAMILIAR LINES.

3. WESTERN REPS SUMMARIZED THE ROUND FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE. THEY EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO TAKE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DESIGN OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND COMMENTED ON THE EAST'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL.

4. FRG REP REVIEWED PAST ROUND FROM WESTERN VIEWPOINT. DATA DISCUSSION HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT IN A BUSINESSLIKE WAY. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA AND EASTERN REPS HAD APPARENTLY COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE SIZE OF EACH SIDE'S MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA WAS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR AN AGREEMENT. BUT THE DATA DISCUSSIONS HAD STILL NOT MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY IN WESTERN AND EASTERN DATA ON MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE EAST HAD MADE NO COMMENSURATE MOVE IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 1975 NOR HAD IT SHOWN ANY WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARDS AN OUTCOME OF GENUINE PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. THE EAST HAD STILL NOT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS WAS COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ON THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE TOGETHER WITH SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET PERSONNEL. THE EAST WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO CONTRACTUALIZE ITS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MOST TYPES OF MAJOR ARMAMENTS AND REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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5. GDR REP SUMMARIZED ROUND FOR EAST. HE CLAIMED THERE WAS AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA AND THAT THE WEST HAD DEPARTED FROM THE PARITY PRINCIPLE IN DEMANDING ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS; IN ASKING FOR THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ALL THE MAJOR TYPES OF ARMAMENTS IN THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WHILE RETAINING COMPLETE FREEDOM FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO INCREASE THEIR ARMAMENTS; IN PROPOSING WITHDRAWING 29,000 US SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY; AND ALSO IN THE FIELD OF STABILIZING MEASURES, WHERE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD PARALYZE THE NORMAL ACTIVITY OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WHILE PERMITTING WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES FULL FREEDOM TO CONTINUE THEIR NORMAL ACTIVITIES. GDR REP ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHAT KIND OF PARITY WAS THIS?

6. CANADIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD COMPOUND THE EAST'S PRESENT GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES UNLESS THIS FACT WERE TO BE TAKEN PROPERLY INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DESIGN OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE WEST HAD DONE THIS. WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER TOOK INTO ACCOUNT PROXIMITY OF SOVIET UNION. THE SAME FACTOR REINFORCED THE NEED TO FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES. IT ALSO HAD A DIRECT BEARING ON WHAT WEST HAD PROPOSED US AND

USSR SHOULD DO IN THE FIRST PHASE. GEOGRAPHY WAS RELEVANT TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, NAMELY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION ON THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE, TOGETHER WITH A SPECIFIC LIMITATION ON THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE US AND USSR IN THE AREA, AND THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY INFLUENCED THE WESTERN POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE USSR WITH ITS LARGE AND UNLIMITED STOCK OF ARMAMENTS.

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P 201721Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0423

FROM US MBFR REP

7. CZECHOSLOVAK REP REVIEWED DATA DISCUSSION DURING PAST ROUND AND CLAIMED THE EAST HAD DONE ITS BEST TO MAKE THE DISCUSSION PRODUCTIVE AND HAD ANSWERED OVER 100 QUESTIONS. THE EAST WAS WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL TOTALS FOR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND TO PROVIDE AVERAGE MANNING LEVELS OF THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH OF THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS EXCHANGE WOULD PROVIDE THE WEST WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPARING ITS FORCE ESTIMATES FOR EACH WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANT WITH THE FIGURES TABLED AND IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY WITHOUT DISCUSSING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES. THE WEST HAD PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE FOR ITS CLAIMS OF AN EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY.

8. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THE EAST WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THE WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL OF JULY 15. BUT, AFTER PRELIMINARY STUDY, EASTERN REPS REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO
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TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS WAS A MORE EFFECTIVE METHOD OF IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF DISCREPANCY. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL REFLECTED OBVIOUS WESTERN EFFORTS TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF THE DIALOG AWAY FROM NUMERICAL STRENGTH TO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. THE WEST WANTED TO MOVE FAR MORE DEEPLY INTO EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS AND UNITS THAN WAS REQUIRED FOR REDUCTION PURPOSES. FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDUCTIONS, THERE WAS NO NEED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON DESIGNATION OF UNITS, THEIR LOCATION AND STRUCTURE. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS COMPLICATED AND WOULD LEAD IN PRACTICE TO DISCLOSURE OF STRUCTURE. IT WOULD PLACE SOME WESTERN COMBAT UNITS AMONG REAR UNITS. IT WOULD REVEAL DETAILS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS TO THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN A SITUATION WHERE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US HAD NOT GIVEN ANY GUARANTEES THAT THEY WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGE OF DATA ON DIVISIONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF THE STRENGTHS OF BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID EAST WOULD PRESENT MORE DEFINITIVE VIEWS AFTER RECESS.

9. US REP PRESENTED SHORT RESUME OF EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL FOR LOCATING THE SOURCE OF DISCREPANCY. GIVEN A DISCREPANCY OF MORE THAN 150,000 MEN, IT WAS PROBABLE THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME SIGNIFICANT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN FIGURES AND EASTERN FIGURES FOR THE FORCES OF EACH EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THIS CREATED A NEED TO LOCATE THE DISCREPANCY WITHIN THE FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT AS WELL AS AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE WEST HAD DELIBERATELY SELECTED THE LARGEST UNITS. IT HAD NOT ASKED FOR THE LOCATION OF EASTERN UNITS. IT WOULD GIVE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME INFORMATION TO THE EAST AS IT WAS ASKING FROM THE EAST. US REP PRESENTED THE NATO APPROVED POSITION THAT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO TABLE DATA ON DIVISIONS WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN PROPOSALS
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PREVIOUSLY TABLED BY BOTH SIDES.

10. GDR REP CHALLENGED NEED FOR TABLING DATA OF MAJOR UNITS OF EACH EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT BEFORE IT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH TABLING OF NATIONAL TOTALS THAT A DISCREPANCY EXISTED BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON THE FORCE TOTALS FOR THAT

PARTICIPANT. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION BETWEEN EASTERN REPS AND FRG REP ON WHETHER FRG TERRITORIAL FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MAJOR FORMATION OR INCLUDED AMONG REMAINING FORCES. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR FORMATIONS IN FRG TERRITORIAL FORCES.

11. TARASOV REVIEWED MAIN ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, WHICH HE SAID WAS BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE AREA WHICH MUST NOT BE UNDERMINED. REDUCTION OF MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY UNITS AND FORMATIONS WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA STILL REFUSED TO UNDERTAKE COMMITMENTS OF DEFINITE SCOPES (SIC) AND TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS, WHICH WAS THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF PHASING. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DID NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS OR OF A NATIONAL CEILING ON THE USSR UNDER CONDITIONS WHERE WESTERN FORCES WHICH REPRESENTED THE MAJORITY OF NATO FORCES IN THE AREA COULD INCREASE. THE REDUCTION METHOD PROPOSED BY THE WEST FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES WAS DISCRIMINATORY. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENTIRE SOVIET TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ARMAMENTS AND LIMIT THOSE ARMAMENTS. THE REDUCTION METHOD SHOULD BE SIMILAR FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AND EFFECTIVE. THE METHOD FOR REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO BE EQUAL. END SUMMARYRESOR

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MBFRV00423
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770258-0237
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1805204
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: SUMMARY OF JULY 19, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION MBFR INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS OF JULY 19, 1977.
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
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Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009